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Transforming the Public Employee
Speech Standard in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille:
More than Meets the Eye
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the middle of last century, the United States Supreme
Court has evaluated speech restrictions imposed by the government
on its employees with an evolving standard that balances the interests
of government efficiency and free speech. This doctrine has been
gradually refined by case law capped by the Court’s 2006 decision in
1
Garcetti v. Ceballos, crystallizing a three-part inquiry into the
protected status of public employee speech under the First
Amendment. In its 2008 opinion, Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School
District No. 84,2 the Ninth Circuit addressed a specific implication of
the Garcetti decision, deciding whether the Supreme Court’s latest
innovation in its protected status inquiry presented a purely legal
question, as historically treated, or a mixed question of fact and law.
In deciding that Garcetti transformed the inquiry into a mixed
question, the Ninth Circuit significantly shifted the delicate balance
established by the High Court over decades, opening the door to
prolonged factual trials and increased settlement costs in public
employee retaliation claims. The circuit court’s twist on the legal
review standard of the test bucks an ingrained practice of
constitutional safeguarding by the courts in the contours between
free speech and its competing interests and threatens to upset the
Supreme Court’s carefully crafted compromise.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The case stems from a lawsuit filed by Robert Posey against Lake
Pend Oreille School District No. 84, alleging that the School
District’s elimination of his position constituted retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment.3 In Posey’s capacity as a “Security
Specialist” for Sandpoint High School, he became concerned about

1. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
2. 546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008).
3. Id. at 1123.
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what he perceived to be certain inadequacies in the school’s safety
and security policies and enforcement of these policies.4 After failing
to generate a satisfactory response from the school’s principal, Posey
expressed his concerns in a letter delivered to several school and
district administrators.5 The letter addressed concerns about various
flaws in Sandpoint’s policies and the school administration’s response
to related problems, as well as Posey’s personal grievances stemming
from his ongoing tension with the school’s administration.6
Following the letter’s delivery, Posey met with two of the
administrators at his home, outside of school hours, to discuss his
concerns.7
Sometime later, Posey learned that his current duties would be
consolidated, along with several other employees’ responsibilities, in
a new position.8 Posey applied for the new position but was not
hired, effectively terminating his employment with the School
District.9 Following the School District’s grievance and appeal
process, which ultimately failed to reinstate him, Posey filed suit in
Idaho state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the
District’s elimination of his position and failure to rehire him
amounted to retaliation for his letter and meeting with school
administrators, in violation of the First Amendment.10 The School
District removed the case to Federal District Court and, following
discovery, moved for summary judgment.11 The School District
argued that Posey’s speech was not protected by the First
Amendment because he made the statements pursuant to his duties
as “Security Specialist.”12
The district court agreed and held, as a matter of law in
accordance with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Garcetti v. Ceballos,13 that Posey’s speech was not protected by the

4. Id. at 1123–24.
5. Id. at 1124.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1125.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, No. CV05-272-N-EJL, 2007 WL
420256, at *3 (D. Idaho Feb. 2, 2007).
13. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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First Amendment.14 According to Garcetti, the district court
explained, employee statements made “‘pursuant to their official
duties’” are not constitutionally protected speech.15 Under this
standard, the district court concluded that Posey spoke in his
capacity as an employee of the School District.16 He did not
communicate through the newspaper or his legislators, as a private
citizen might, and his statements stemmed from the types of
activities that he was paid to perform.17 As Posey’s speech was thus
unprotected under the First Amendment, pursuant to Garcetti, the
court granted the School District’s motion for summary judgment.18
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Beginnings of Public Employee Speech Protection
The Garcetti standard applied by the district court represents the
recent capstone of the United States Supreme Court’s First
Amendment doctrine on public employee speech. Up until the
middle of the twentieth century, public employees enjoyed no
recognized constitutional protection from conditions placed upon
their employment, including those that restricted constitutional
rights, such as free speech.19 This trend in the Court’s jurisprudence
changed course in the 1950s and 60s, as reflected in a number of
cases that invalidated political affiliation conditions of public
employment.20 In 1967, the Court rejected the theory “that public
14. Posey, 2007 WL 420256, at *5.
15. Id. at *3 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543–44 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006))).
16. Id. at *5.
17. Id. (citing Green v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800–01 (10th Cir.
2007)).
18. Id.
19. Consider Justice Holmes’ famous words, writing for the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts: “[A policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman.” McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517,
517 (Mass. 1892), cited in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–45 (1983). This sentiment
symbolized the Supreme Court’s law through the early 1950s. See, e.g., Adler v. Bd. of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (“If [public employees] do not choose to work on [terms that
restrict their freedom of association], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations
and go elsewhere.”).
20. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (determining it was
unconstitutional to deny employment on the basis of previous party membership); Wiemann v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (invalidating a requirement to deny past affiliation with the
Communist party).
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employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable . . . .”21 The
following year, the Court applied this general principle to the speech
of public employees in the seminal case Pickering v. Board of
Education.22
B. Pickering v. Board of Education
Marvin Pickering, an Illinois high school teacher, was fired for
sending a letter to a local newspaper that criticized the school’s
revenue raising proposals.23 While recognizing that the government’s
role as an employer regulating speech differs from its role in
regulating the speech of private citizens, the Supreme Court held
that public employees do not entirely relinquish their First
Amendment rights by virtue of public employment.24 The Court also
emphasized the unique and vital role that public employees play in
fostering free and open debate about matters of public importance
among an informed electorate—a role that serves the public as a
whole and that must be protected from the chilling effects of
retaliation.25
In deciding cases involving the free speech rights of public
employees, the Court instructed, an appropriate balance must be
struck “between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”26 Where the Pickering
Court declined to lay down a discrete standard for judging this
delicate balance between individual free speech interests and those of
the public employer—instead merely “indicat[ing] some of the
general lines along which an analysis . . . should run”27—the circuit
21. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605–06 (1967).
22. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
23. Id. at 564.
24. Id. at 568.
25. See id. at 571–72; see also San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“The interest
at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s
own right to disseminate it.”). However, the protection of public employee speech is not based
solely on the policy of preserving open public discourse. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch.
Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (extending the same protection to private statements by public
employees on matters of public concern).
26. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–69.
27. Id. at 569.
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courts subsequently filled the void with a variety of subtly unique
standards.28
C. Connick v. Myers
Fifteen years later, the Court revisited this maturing standard in
Connick v. Myers.29 Assistant District Attorney Sheila Myers,
disgruntled by her supervisor’s decision to transfer her to a less
desirable assignment, was terminated for circulating a questionnaire
among her associates concerning various potential problems in the
office working environment.30 Upon review of the lower court’s
judgment that Myers was fired in retaliation for her exercise of a
constitutionally protected free speech right,31 the Supreme Court
solidified the two-part analysis implied by the Pickering Court. First,
as a threshold, the Court must determine whether the speech may
“be fairly characterized” as touching upon a matter of public
concern.32 Then, if the employee’s speech is related to a matter of
public concern, the Court must proceed to judge whether the
employer had adequate justification to restrict the employee’s speech
under the balancing inquiry contemplated in Pickering.33
D. Garcetti v. Ceballos
More than two decades later, the Court’s 2006 Garcetti decision
expanded the test once again, from two parts to three, with the
addition of yet another threshold inquiry. The Garcetti Court,
perhaps relying on the compound language (“as a citizen upon
matters of public concern”) in Connick,34 effectively split the
Connick threshold test in two. “[W]hen public employees make
28. See, e.g., Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[W]hether a
public employee’s statements unduly interfere with the efficiency with which governmental
services are provided.”); Kaprelian v. Tex. Woman’s Univ., 509 F.2d 133, 140 (5th Cir. 1975)
(whether the employee’s exercise of speech “clearly over-balanced” the employee’s
“usefulness” as an employee) (citing Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 859 (5th Cir.
1970)); Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 517 (5th Cir. 1974) (whether the employee’s
speech “substantially and materially interferes with the discharge of duties and responsibilities
inherent in such employment”).
29. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
30. Id. at 140–41.
31. Id. at 141–42.
32. Id. at 146–47.
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 147.
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statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes . . . .”35 Thus,
following Garcetti, the standard for determining whether a
government employer’s restriction on a public employee’s speech
violates the First Amendment requires three separate inquiries. First,
a court must determine whether the employee spoke pursuant to his
official duties, as opposed to speaking as a private citizen.36 If the
employee spoke as a private citizen, the court then must decide
whether that speech relates to a matter of public concern.37 Finally, if
both of these thresholds are met, the court must judge whether the
employer was justified in restricting the speech, balancing the
employer’s interests in promoting the effective functioning of its
enterprise with the interests of free speech.38
This standard represents the Supreme Court’s effort to balance
two vital, yet competitive, interests: the government employer’s
interest in promoting the efficient operation of public services and
the shared interest of the public employee and the community at
large in preserving the value of unfettered speech.39 The Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School District No. 8440
signals a material shift in this balancing act.
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION
On review of the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
the School District, the Ninth Circuit in Posey laid out the framework
for sustaining a First Amendment retaliation claim: the public
employee must show “(1) [t]he employee engaged in
constitutionally protected speech, (2) the employer took adverse
employment action against the employee, and (3) the employee’s
speech was a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor in the adverse
action.”41 The combined Pickering-Connick-Garcetti test answered
the first of these three elements, and, until Posey, the court answered
it purely as a matter of law before the remaining two elements were

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
Id. at 421–23.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 146–47.
Id.
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19.
546 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1126 (citing Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 543 (9th Cir. 2006)).
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to be evaluated by the trier of fact.42 In the opinion of the circuit
court, however, the Supreme Court’s recent Garcetti decision raised
the question as to whether the first element remained entirely a
question of law.43
Specifically, the circuit court focused on the dispute between
Posey and the School District as to his job responsibilities. The
nature of Posey’s job duties was critical to the court’s proper analysis
of the Garcetti threshold questions, and the district court’s
determination that Posey’s speech was made pursuant to those duties
ended the inquiry and supported its summary judgment for the
School District.44 The parties, however, disputed whether Posey had
any policy-making responsibilities that would support the conclusion
that his job duties required his letter and the meeting.45 In Garcetti,
the circuit court pointed out, there was no such dispute—both sides
conceded that the speech in question was performed pursuant to the
speaker’s employment responsibilities.46 In the circuit court’s view,
the existence of this dispute distinguished Posey’s case from Garcetti,
and required the court to decide whether Garcetti’s contribution to
the public employee speech standard “transformed” the protected
status inquiry “into a mixed question of fact and law.”47
Looking to its sister courts for guidance, the Ninth Circuit panel
recognized a split among other circuits deciding this question:48
specifically, the Fifth,49 Tenth,50 and D.C.51 Circuits had determined
that all three steps of the inquiry into the protected status of speech
were matters of law properly decided at summary judgment. The
other side of the split is a bit hazier: the Third Circuit clearly has
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1126–27.
45. Id. at 1125; see supra Part II.
46. Id. at 1127 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 513 n.17 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that,
even if it requires a factual inquiry, the question of whether employee speech is protected is a
legal one properly answered at summary judgment)).
50. Id. (citing Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1202–
03 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that each of the three steps in the protected speech inquiry,
including the Garcetti question, is to be resolved by the court and not the trier of fact)).
51. Id. at 1128 (citing Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007)
(holding that the Garcetti inquiry is a question of law for the court to decide and not a
question of fact)).
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indicated that the Garcetti inquiry is a mixed question,52 along with
whom the Seventh Circuit has implicitly agreed;53 additionally, the
Eighth Circuit had concluded, prior to Garcetti, that the Pickering
balancing of interests test was a mixed question.54 The Ninth Circuit
panel sided with the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits.55
In support of its decision to fall on the “mixed question” side of
the debate, the circuit court in Posey directed its attention to the
“guidance” offered by the Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., for divining the appropriate distinction
between questions of fact and law: “[f]acts that can be ‘found’ by
‘application of . . . ordinary principles of logic and common
experience . . . are ordinarily entrusted to the finder of fact.’”56 This
guiding principle, in connection with the Garcetti Court’s seemingly
similar recommendation that “‘[t]he proper inquiry is a practical
one,’ requiring more than mere mechanical reference to ‘[f]ormal
job descriptions,’”57 led the circuit court to conclude that a “factual
determination of a plaintiff’s job responsibilities will not encroach
upon the court’s prerogative to interpret and apply the relevant legal
rules.”58 Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that the 2006 Garcetti

52. Id. (citing Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[W]hether a particular incident of speech is made within a particular plaintiff's job duties is a
mixed question of fact and law.”)).
53. Id. (citing Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008)). The Posey
court interpreted Davis to find “that since ‘no rational trier of fact could find’ that Davis’s
speech had been made as a private citizen, summary judgment was appropriate.” Id. (quoting
Davis, 534 F.3d at 653).
54. Id. (citing Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ny
underlying factual disputes concerning whether the speech at issue [is] protected should [be]
submitted to the jury.”)).
Further, the Posey court noted that even within the Ninth Circuit, district courts had
reached conflicting conclusions on the issue. Id. at 1128 n.4 (comparing Neveu v. City of
Fresno, No. CV-F-04-6490, 2007 WL 2330775, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007) (question of
law) with Shewbridge v. El Dorado Irrigation Dist., No. CIV. S-05-0940, 2006 WL 3741878,
at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2006) (mixed question), and also citing Clarke v. Multnomah
County, No. CV-06-229, 2007 WL 915175, at *12 (D. Or. Mar. 23, 2007) (determining the
inquiry to be a question of law but granting summary judgment on the basis that “no
reasonable juror could conclude anything but all of plaintiff's communications were pursuant
to her official job duties”)).
55. Id. at 1129.
56. Id. (quoting 466 U.S. 485, 501 n.17 (1984)).
57. Id. (quoting 547 U.S. 424–25).
58. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) (“An issue does not lose its
factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional
question.”).
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decision transformed the protected status inquiry from a purely legal
one into a mixed question of fact and law, with the specific question
of the “scope and content” of a public employee’s official job duties
a question of fact.59
V. ANALYSIS
While the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Posey does nothing to
change the substantive nature of the Supreme Court’s test, by
transforming one of the three questions from purely legal to mixed,
it substantially shifts the balance the Court has constructed between
the two competing policy interests. This shift is a step backward in
the Court’s effort to resolve the tension between First Amendment
values and government efficiency. First, the decision is based upon a
perceived split among the circuits that is not as stark as the Ninth
Circuit paints it. Second, the decision runs contrary to analogous
standards guiding similar constitutional doctrines. Finally, as a
practical matter, the doctrine does little to improve the protection of
First Amendment values, while greatly hampering the ability of
government employers to operate efficiently.
A. The Circuit Split
The circuit panel in Posey relied on the split among its sister
circuits as an opportunity to transform the legal standard of the
protected status inquiry.60 Upon closer examination, however, the
“split” among the circuits appears more like one outlying circuit,
accompanied by misinterpreted language from another circuit and
the extension of yet another circuit’s logic from an application of a
different standard prior to Garcetti.
In its interpretation of the Seventh Circuit’s position, the Posey
court relied on Davis v. Cook County, which determined that “no
rational trier of fact could find” that the speech was made in the
capacity of a private citizen.61 In a vacuum, this phrase seemingly
supports the “question of fact” position on the issue, but the
surrounding context and ultimate holding imply something
different. The court in Davis reviewed a summary judgment from the
59. Id. at 1129–30.
60. See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text.
61. Posey, 546 F.3d at 1128 (quoting Davis v. Cook County, 534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th
Cir. 2008).
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district court, which found, as a matter of law, that Davis’s speech
deserved no First Amendment protection.62 The district court’s
decision was delivered prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Garcetti, but on review, the circuit court applied the new standard
and upheld the lower court’s summary judgment.63
Responding to Davis’s argument that the Garcetti question
should be heard by a jury, the court noted that “‘[t]he inquiry into
the protected speech is one of law, not fact.’”64 The subsequent
language quoted by the Ninth Circuit in Posey is a response to
Davis’s claim of entitlement to a jury trial, deflating that argument in
the alternative by indicating that “no rational trier of fact could find”
that her speech was made as a private citizen (even if the question
were submitted to a jury). Further, the circuit court in Davis then
proceeded to analyze the facts surrounding Davis’s speech and her
job responsibilities under the Garcetti test—an exercise the district
had never conducted—before ultimately holding that her speech did
not satisfy this threshold prong of the protected speech inquiry.65
Such an analysis by the court would seem strange indeed, had the
court not intended to resolve the question as a matter of law.
The Posey court cites the Eighth Circuit as further support of the
purported split.66 In Casey v. City of Cabool, that court held that “any
underlying factual disputes concerning whether the speech at issue
[is] protected should [be] submitted to the jury.”67 In the first place,
as the Ninth Circuit points out, this case was decided prior to
Garcetti, and the quoted language consequently refers to the
balancing prong of the original Pickering-Connick test.68 Casey at
best supports an implication that the same logic would extend to the
recent Garcetti decision—the same form of implication that,
coincidentally, the Ninth Circuit rejected in Posey by failing to
maintain its previous standard of legal review when it determined
that the Garcetti case transformed the question from one of law to a

62. Davis, 534 F.3d at 651; Davis v. Cook County, No. 04 C 8218, 2006 WL 218166,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2006).
63. Davis, 534 F.3d at 652.
64. Id. at 653 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)).
65. Id.
66. See supra note 54.
67. 12 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Shands v. City of Kennett, 993 F.2d
1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993)).
68. See id. at 802–03.
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mixed question.69 Additionally, since the Garcetti opinion, the
Eighth Circuit has had the opportunity to apply its innovation to the
public employee speech threshold, and has consistently applied it as a
question of law.70
Finally, the Third Circuit indeed maintains the position that the
Garcetti analysis poses a mixed question of fact and law with respect
to whether speech is made within the employee’s job duties.71 In
sum, what the Ninth Circuit has labeled a “split” among its sister
circuits in reality amounts to the Third Circuit as an outlier, with the
Seventh Circuit, to the extent its position is clear at all, curiously
appearing to side with the Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, and the
Eighth Circuit consistently interpreting the Garcetti addition as a
matter of law, despite its approach to the Pickering-Connick test
prior to Garcetti.72 This tenuous support from only the Third Circuit
provides little real strength, especially when considered in light of the
Supreme Court’s trends in similar doctrines, and the practical policy
in advancing goals discussed below.
B. Safeguarding Constitutional Boundaries
Irrespective of the positions of other circuits, the Ninth Circuit’s
position is difficult to square with the Supreme Court’s own
69. See Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist, No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127, 1129 (9th
Cir. 2008) (questioning whether Garcetti transformed the protected speech inquiry from its
previous status as purely a question of law into a mixed question of fact and law, and then
deciding that it did).
70. See, e.g., Davenport v. Univ. of Ark. Bd. of Trs., 553 F.3d 1110, 1113 (8th Cir.
2009) (affirming the finding of the district court, as a matter of law, that plaintiff’s speech was
made pursuant to his official job duties); Kozisek v. County of Seward, 539 F.3d 930, 937
(8th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court’s ruling that plaintiff’s speech was not protected
because it was purely job-related); Bradley v. James, 479 F.3d 536, 537–38 (8th Cir. 2007)
(evaluating plaintiff’s job duties to determine whether his speech was protected under the
Garcetti threshold); McGee v. Pub. Water Supply Dist. No. 2, 471 F.3d 918, 920–21 (8th
Cir. 2006) (interpreting the Garcetti decision for the first time in the Eighth Circuit and
indicating that its inquiry is a “question of law for the court” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983)).
71. See Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Foraker
v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)).
72. In his summary of this same circuit split, JoNel Newman recognizes only the Ninth
(Posey) and Third Circuits as having decided the Garcetti analysis is a mixed question. JoNel
Newman, Will Teachers Shed Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gate? The
Eleventh Circuit’s Post-Garcetti Juriprudence, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761, 786 n.170 (2009).
The Sixth Circuit appears to support the “question of law” view on the issue as well. See
Haynes v. City of Circleville, 474 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007) (deciding the Garcetti
analysis with no mention of a mixed question).
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doctrinal patterns. First, Connick itself makes abundantly clear the
Court’s position prior to Garcetti: “The inquiry into the protected
status of speech is one of law, not fact.”73 Further, after recognizing
the difficulty in balancing the competing interests inherent in the
inquiry, the Connick Court emphasized the obligation that it has “to
examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances
under which they are made to see whether or not they . . . are of a
character which the principles of the First Amendment . . .
protect.”74 The Court previously announced this obligation in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and further stressed the importance of the
Court’s particular role in safeguarding the boundary “‘between
speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may
legitimately be regulated,’” to ensure that the judgment does not
inappropriately intrude on free expression.75 “Because of this
obligation,” the Connick Court declares, “we cannot ‘avoid making
an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the case.’”76
Thus, the Supreme Court has established a clear policy of
policing the lines between First Amendment speech rights and other
competing interests, answering questions of constitutional protection
as a matter of law, not fact. There is no evidence from the Court to
suggest that this longstanding mandate should be transformed,
except for vague language from Garcetti cited by the Ninth Circuit
to support its change: “[t]he proper inquiry is a practical one.”77
From this brief phrase, the Ninth Circuit draws a distinction between
“concrete and practical” and “abstract and formal,” with the former
relegated to a question of fact and the latter a question of law.78 This
construction seems to imbue a few selected words with more
meaning than intended. The Garcetti Court’s words were a response
rejecting the dissenting opinion writer’s notion that, under the
majority’s new standard, employers could restrict employees’ rights
by merely concocting “excessively broad job descriptions.”79 The
73. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).
74. Id. at 150 n.10 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
75. 376 U.S. 254, 284–85 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525
(1958)).
76. 461 U.S. at 150 n.10 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 (1964)
(Brennan, J.)).
77. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006), cited in Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2008).
78. Posey, 546 F.3d at 1129.
79. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.
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inquiry is “a practical one”—that is, the court cannot rely solely on
the formal job descriptions of an employee in order to determine the
protected status of the speech.80 Nothing in that reasoning implies
that the Garcetti Court intended to alter its deeply held commitment
to review the protected speech question as a matter of law, and the
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on this language is therefore misplaced.
C. Practical and Economic Concerns
Finally, practical policy considerations weigh against the Ninth
Circuit’s transformation. The Supreme Court’s construction of the
current public employee speech standard is a well-crafted balance
between the competing interests of government efficiency and First
Amendment free speech values.81 The government would bear a
substantial burden were it subject to the same standard in regulating
its employees’ speech as it is in regulating private citizen speech.
Indeed, the Court’s recognition of this burden animates the
deference the Court gives to government employers in making
employment decisions that restrict free speech.82 This deference is
reflected not only in the substance of the combined protected status
test, but also in the review standard under which it is conducted.83
While the Posey court left the substance of the Pickering-ConnickGarcetti analysis intact, by transforming the legal review standard to
include a question of fact it effectively shifted the balance that the
test reflects. The result is a greater social cost, with little free speech
benefit.
On the one hand, the shift does little to further protect the
interests of free speech. Ignoring the potential difference in outcome
between the trier of fact and the court as the interpreter of law
deciding the question, the real difference is one of timing and costs,
not ultimate outcome. While this may produce some nominal value
to plaintiffs who live to fight another day in court, its curb on the
chilling effect to speech is likely minimal.

80. Id.
81. See id. at 417; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
82. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143 (noting that the Pickering standard and its progeny
reflect “the common sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter”).
83. See id. at 150 n.10.
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On the other hand, the real impact of this shift will be
recognized in the public cost of litigation stemming from lawsuits by
government employees that will survive summary judgment and
proceed to the conclusion of fact-trying. In the form of increased
settlement value for retaliation claims, the public will bear the cost of
the switch, not to mention the indirect effect it will have on the
efficiency of government employers who will base employment
decisions on the heightened cost of potential litigation. Under the
purely legal review standard, summary judgment is available in cases
where the speech at issue is determined by the court to be made
pursuant to official job duties. This is the practical benefit of
incremental threshold inquiries—they avoid the later questions
where unnecessary. In fact, the entire first element of a First
Amendment retaliation claim is designed to filter claims before
proceeding to the factual inquiry of the last two elements.84
The Ninth Circuit panel in Posey seemed to recognize the
practicality of this reasoning, yet with no explanation, the court
rearranged the order of the inquiry elements, switching the typically
first threshold of Garcetti to the final question of the protected
speech inquiry.85 Perhaps the court realized the practical conundrum
of engaging in questions of fact only to return again to purely legal
questions that could make the factual questions moot. Now that the
court has transformed the Garcetti analysis into a mixed question of
fact and law, that inquiry must trail the remaining Pickering-Connick
tests in order to avoid a logistical quandary.
The upshot of this change is a greatly reduced prospect of
summary judgment for government employers. Any employee
plaintiff can easily create a dispute as to the scope and content of his
job responsibilities, thereby forcing a factual inquiry and avoiding
summary judgment’s procedural safeguard of the government
employer’s interest in efficiency.86 Thus, the Connick Court’s fear has
become prophetic: every employment decision risks the prospect of
becoming subject to a fact trial as a constitutional matter.87

84. See Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.
2008).
85. Id. at 1130–31.
86. This ease is illustrated by Posey itself. The court notes that the parties “shifted” their
characterizations of Posey’s job duties after the “identification of the relevant legal questions at
issue in [the] case.” Id. at 1125 n.1.
87. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143.

298

DO NOT DELETE

285

3/6/2010 2:20 PM

Transforming the Public Employee Speech Standard
VI. CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s transformation in Posey alters the protected
status inquiry into public employee speech in a way that runs
contrary to the weight of circuit court opinion on the issue, current
Supreme Court law, and the practical underpinnings of the doctrine.
Treating the Garcetti analysis as a mixed question of fact and law
introduces unpredictable and inconsistent factual interpretation in a
way that directly impacts the line between constitutionally protected
and unprotected speech. This practice stands in stark opposition to
the serious obligation of the courts to preserve the carefully crafted
boundaries of competing constitutional interests and risks upsetting
a delicate constitutional balance between government and its
employees’ speech.
Benjamin M. Smith
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